mirror of
https://github.com/hypervortex/VH-Bombsquad-Modded-Server-Files
synced 2025-11-07 17:36:08 +00:00
Delete dist directory
This commit is contained in:
Mikahael
GitHub
parent
2e2c838750
commit
867634cc5c
1779 changed files with 0 additions and 565850 deletions
|
|
@ -1,599 +0,0 @@
|
|||
# This file is dual licensed under the terms of the Apache License, Version
|
||||
# 2.0, and the BSD License. See the LICENSE file in the root of this repository
|
||||
# for complete details.
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import typing
|
||||
|
||||
from cryptography.exceptions import (
|
||||
InvalidSignature,
|
||||
UnsupportedAlgorithm,
|
||||
_Reasons,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl.utils import (
|
||||
_calculate_digest_and_algorithm,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import utils as asym_utils
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.padding import (
|
||||
MGF1,
|
||||
OAEP,
|
||||
PSS,
|
||||
AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
PKCS1v15,
|
||||
_Auto,
|
||||
_DigestLength,
|
||||
_MaxLength,
|
||||
calculate_max_pss_salt_length,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.rsa import (
|
||||
RSAPrivateKey,
|
||||
RSAPrivateNumbers,
|
||||
RSAPublicKey,
|
||||
RSAPublicNumbers,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if typing.TYPE_CHECKING:
|
||||
from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl.backend import Backend
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_rsa_pss_salt_length(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
pss: PSS,
|
||||
key: typing.Union[RSAPrivateKey, RSAPublicKey],
|
||||
hash_algorithm: hashes.HashAlgorithm,
|
||||
) -> int:
|
||||
salt = pss._salt_length
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(salt, _MaxLength):
|
||||
return calculate_max_pss_salt_length(key, hash_algorithm)
|
||||
elif isinstance(salt, _DigestLength):
|
||||
return hash_algorithm.digest_size
|
||||
elif isinstance(salt, _Auto):
|
||||
if isinstance(key, RSAPrivateKey):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"PSS salt length can only be set to AUTO when verifying"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return backend._lib.RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return salt
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _enc_dec_rsa(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
key: typing.Union[_RSAPrivateKey, _RSAPublicKey],
|
||||
data: bytes,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
if not isinstance(padding, AsymmetricPadding):
|
||||
raise TypeError("Padding must be an instance of AsymmetricPadding.")
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(padding, PKCS1v15):
|
||||
padding_enum = backend._lib.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
|
||||
elif isinstance(padding, OAEP):
|
||||
padding_enum = backend._lib.RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
|
||||
|
||||
if not isinstance(padding._mgf, MGF1):
|
||||
raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(
|
||||
"Only MGF1 is supported by this backend.",
|
||||
_Reasons.UNSUPPORTED_MGF,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not backend.rsa_padding_supported(padding):
|
||||
raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(
|
||||
"This combination of padding and hash algorithm is not "
|
||||
"supported by this backend.",
|
||||
_Reasons.UNSUPPORTED_PADDING,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(
|
||||
f"{padding.name} is not supported by this backend.",
|
||||
_Reasons.UNSUPPORTED_PADDING,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _enc_dec_rsa_pkey_ctx(backend, key, data, padding_enum, padding)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _enc_dec_rsa_pkey_ctx(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
key: typing.Union[_RSAPrivateKey, _RSAPublicKey],
|
||||
data: bytes,
|
||||
padding_enum: int,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
init: typing.Callable[[typing.Any], int]
|
||||
crypt: typing.Callable[[typing.Any, typing.Any, int, bytes, int], int]
|
||||
if isinstance(key, _RSAPublicKey):
|
||||
init = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init
|
||||
crypt = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_encrypt
|
||||
else:
|
||||
init = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init
|
||||
crypt = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_decrypt
|
||||
|
||||
pkey_ctx = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key._evp_pkey, backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(pkey_ctx != backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
pkey_ctx = backend._ffi.gc(pkey_ctx, backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_free)
|
||||
res = init(pkey_ctx)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res == 1)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, padding_enum)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res > 0)
|
||||
buf_size = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_size(key._evp_pkey)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(buf_size > 0)
|
||||
if isinstance(padding, OAEP):
|
||||
mgf1_md = backend._evp_md_non_null_from_algorithm(
|
||||
padding._mgf._algorithm
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkey_ctx, mgf1_md)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res > 0)
|
||||
oaep_md = backend._evp_md_non_null_from_algorithm(padding._algorithm)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(pkey_ctx, oaep_md)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res > 0)
|
||||
|
||||
if (
|
||||
isinstance(padding, OAEP)
|
||||
and padding._label is not None
|
||||
and len(padding._label) > 0
|
||||
):
|
||||
# set0_rsa_oaep_label takes ownership of the char * so we need to
|
||||
# copy it into some new memory
|
||||
labelptr = backend._lib.OPENSSL_malloc(len(padding._label))
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(labelptr != backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
backend._ffi.memmove(labelptr, padding._label, len(padding._label))
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(
|
||||
pkey_ctx, labelptr, len(padding._label)
|
||||
)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res == 1)
|
||||
|
||||
outlen = backend._ffi.new("size_t *", buf_size)
|
||||
buf = backend._ffi.new("unsigned char[]", buf_size)
|
||||
# Everything from this line onwards is written with the goal of being as
|
||||
# constant-time as is practical given the constraints of Python and our
|
||||
# API. See Bleichenbacher's '98 attack on RSA, and its many many variants.
|
||||
# As such, you should not attempt to change this (particularly to "clean it
|
||||
# up") without understanding why it was written this way (see
|
||||
# Chesterton's Fence), and without measuring to verify you have not
|
||||
# introduced observable time differences.
|
||||
res = crypt(pkey_ctx, buf, outlen, data, len(data))
|
||||
resbuf = backend._ffi.buffer(buf)[: outlen[0]]
|
||||
backend._lib.ERR_clear_error()
|
||||
if res <= 0:
|
||||
raise ValueError("Encryption/decryption failed.")
|
||||
return resbuf
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rsa_sig_determine_padding(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
key: typing.Union[_RSAPrivateKey, _RSAPublicKey],
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: typing.Optional[hashes.HashAlgorithm],
|
||||
) -> int:
|
||||
if not isinstance(padding, AsymmetricPadding):
|
||||
raise TypeError("Expected provider of AsymmetricPadding.")
|
||||
|
||||
pkey_size = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_size(key._evp_pkey)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(pkey_size > 0)
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(padding, PKCS1v15):
|
||||
# Hash algorithm is ignored for PKCS1v15-padding, may be None.
|
||||
padding_enum = backend._lib.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
|
||||
elif isinstance(padding, PSS):
|
||||
if not isinstance(padding._mgf, MGF1):
|
||||
raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(
|
||||
"Only MGF1 is supported by this backend.",
|
||||
_Reasons.UNSUPPORTED_MGF,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# PSS padding requires a hash algorithm
|
||||
if not isinstance(algorithm, hashes.HashAlgorithm):
|
||||
raise TypeError("Expected instance of hashes.HashAlgorithm.")
|
||||
|
||||
# Size of key in bytes - 2 is the maximum
|
||||
# PSS signature length (salt length is checked later)
|
||||
if pkey_size - algorithm.digest_size - 2 < 0:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"Digest too large for key size. Use a larger "
|
||||
"key or different digest."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
padding_enum = backend._lib.RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(
|
||||
f"{padding.name} is not supported by this backend.",
|
||||
_Reasons.UNSUPPORTED_PADDING,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return padding_enum
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Hash algorithm can be absent (None) to initialize the context without setting
|
||||
# any message digest algorithm. This is currently only valid for the PKCS1v15
|
||||
# padding type, where it means that the signature data is encoded/decoded
|
||||
# as provided, without being wrapped in a DigestInfo structure.
|
||||
def _rsa_sig_setup(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: typing.Optional[hashes.HashAlgorithm],
|
||||
key: typing.Union[_RSAPublicKey, _RSAPrivateKey],
|
||||
init_func: typing.Callable[[typing.Any], int],
|
||||
):
|
||||
padding_enum = _rsa_sig_determine_padding(backend, key, padding, algorithm)
|
||||
pkey_ctx = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key._evp_pkey, backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(pkey_ctx != backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
pkey_ctx = backend._ffi.gc(pkey_ctx, backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_free)
|
||||
res = init_func(pkey_ctx)
|
||||
if res != 1:
|
||||
errors = backend._consume_errors()
|
||||
raise ValueError("Unable to sign/verify with this key", errors)
|
||||
|
||||
if algorithm is not None:
|
||||
evp_md = backend._evp_md_non_null_from_algorithm(algorithm)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkey_ctx, evp_md)
|
||||
if res <= 0:
|
||||
backend._consume_errors()
|
||||
raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(
|
||||
"{} is not supported by this backend for RSA signing.".format(
|
||||
algorithm.name
|
||||
),
|
||||
_Reasons.UNSUPPORTED_HASH,
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, padding_enum)
|
||||
if res <= 0:
|
||||
backend._consume_errors()
|
||||
raise UnsupportedAlgorithm(
|
||||
"{} is not supported for the RSA signature operation.".format(
|
||||
padding.name
|
||||
),
|
||||
_Reasons.UNSUPPORTED_PADDING,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if isinstance(padding, PSS):
|
||||
assert isinstance(algorithm, hashes.HashAlgorithm)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(
|
||||
pkey_ctx,
|
||||
_get_rsa_pss_salt_length(backend, padding, key, algorithm),
|
||||
)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res > 0)
|
||||
|
||||
mgf1_md = backend._evp_md_non_null_from_algorithm(
|
||||
padding._mgf._algorithm
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkey_ctx, mgf1_md)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res > 0)
|
||||
|
||||
return pkey_ctx
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rsa_sig_sign(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: hashes.HashAlgorithm,
|
||||
private_key: _RSAPrivateKey,
|
||||
data: bytes,
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
pkey_ctx = _rsa_sig_setup(
|
||||
backend,
|
||||
padding,
|
||||
algorithm,
|
||||
private_key,
|
||||
backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_sign_init,
|
||||
)
|
||||
buflen = backend._ffi.new("size_t *")
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_sign(
|
||||
pkey_ctx, backend._ffi.NULL, buflen, data, len(data)
|
||||
)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res == 1)
|
||||
buf = backend._ffi.new("unsigned char[]", buflen[0])
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_sign(pkey_ctx, buf, buflen, data, len(data))
|
||||
if res != 1:
|
||||
errors = backend._consume_errors()
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"Digest or salt length too long for key size. Use a larger key "
|
||||
"or shorter salt length if you are specifying a PSS salt",
|
||||
errors,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return backend._ffi.buffer(buf)[:]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rsa_sig_verify(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: hashes.HashAlgorithm,
|
||||
public_key: _RSAPublicKey,
|
||||
signature: bytes,
|
||||
data: bytes,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
pkey_ctx = _rsa_sig_setup(
|
||||
backend,
|
||||
padding,
|
||||
algorithm,
|
||||
public_key,
|
||||
backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_verify_init,
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_verify(
|
||||
pkey_ctx, signature, len(signature), data, len(data)
|
||||
)
|
||||
# The previous call can return negative numbers in the event of an
|
||||
# error. This is not a signature failure but we need to fail if it
|
||||
# occurs.
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(res >= 0)
|
||||
if res == 0:
|
||||
backend._consume_errors()
|
||||
raise InvalidSignature
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rsa_sig_recover(
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: typing.Optional[hashes.HashAlgorithm],
|
||||
public_key: _RSAPublicKey,
|
||||
signature: bytes,
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
pkey_ctx = _rsa_sig_setup(
|
||||
backend,
|
||||
padding,
|
||||
algorithm,
|
||||
public_key,
|
||||
backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Attempt to keep the rest of the code in this function as constant/time
|
||||
# as possible. See the comment in _enc_dec_rsa_pkey_ctx. Note that the
|
||||
# buflen parameter is used even though its value may be undefined in the
|
||||
# error case. Due to the tolerant nature of Python slicing this does not
|
||||
# trigger any exceptions.
|
||||
maxlen = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_size(public_key._evp_pkey)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(maxlen > 0)
|
||||
buf = backend._ffi.new("unsigned char[]", maxlen)
|
||||
buflen = backend._ffi.new("size_t *", maxlen)
|
||||
res = backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(
|
||||
pkey_ctx, buf, buflen, signature, len(signature)
|
||||
)
|
||||
resbuf = backend._ffi.buffer(buf)[: buflen[0]]
|
||||
backend._lib.ERR_clear_error()
|
||||
# Assume that all parameter errors are handled during the setup phase and
|
||||
# any error here is due to invalid signature.
|
||||
if res != 1:
|
||||
raise InvalidSignature
|
||||
return resbuf
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _RSAPrivateKey(RSAPrivateKey):
|
||||
_evp_pkey: object
|
||||
_rsa_cdata: object
|
||||
_key_size: int
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
backend: Backend,
|
||||
rsa_cdata,
|
||||
evp_pkey,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
unsafe_skip_rsa_key_validation: bool,
|
||||
):
|
||||
res: int
|
||||
# RSA_check_key is slower in OpenSSL 3.0.0 due to improved
|
||||
# primality checking. In normal use this is unlikely to be a problem
|
||||
# since users don't load new keys constantly, but for TESTING we've
|
||||
# added an init arg that allows skipping the checks. You should not
|
||||
# use this in production code unless you understand the consequences.
|
||||
if not unsafe_skip_rsa_key_validation:
|
||||
res = backend._lib.RSA_check_key(rsa_cdata)
|
||||
if res != 1:
|
||||
errors = backend._consume_errors()
|
||||
raise ValueError("Invalid private key", errors)
|
||||
# 2 is prime and passes an RSA key check, so we also check
|
||||
# if p and q are odd just to be safe.
|
||||
p = backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
q = backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
backend._lib.RSA_get0_factors(rsa_cdata, p, q)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(p[0] != backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
backend.openssl_assert(q[0] != backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
p_odd = backend._lib.BN_is_odd(p[0])
|
||||
q_odd = backend._lib.BN_is_odd(q[0])
|
||||
if p_odd != 1 or q_odd != 1:
|
||||
errors = backend._consume_errors()
|
||||
raise ValueError("Invalid private key", errors)
|
||||
|
||||
self._backend = backend
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata = rsa_cdata
|
||||
self._evp_pkey = evp_pkey
|
||||
# Used for lazy blinding
|
||||
self._blinded = False
|
||||
self._blinding_lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
n = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
self._backend._lib.RSA_get0_key(
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata,
|
||||
n,
|
||||
self._backend._ffi.NULL,
|
||||
self._backend._ffi.NULL,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(n[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._key_size = self._backend._lib.BN_num_bits(n[0])
|
||||
|
||||
def _enable_blinding(self) -> None:
|
||||
# If you call blind on an already blinded RSA key OpenSSL will turn
|
||||
# it off and back on, which is a performance hit we want to avoid.
|
||||
if not self._blinded:
|
||||
with self._blinding_lock:
|
||||
self._non_threadsafe_enable_blinding()
|
||||
|
||||
def _non_threadsafe_enable_blinding(self) -> None:
|
||||
# This is only a separate function to allow for testing to cover both
|
||||
# branches. It should never be invoked except through _enable_blinding.
|
||||
# Check if it's not True again in case another thread raced past the
|
||||
# first non-locked check.
|
||||
if not self._blinded:
|
||||
res = self._backend._lib.RSA_blinding_on(
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata, self._backend._ffi.NULL
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(res == 1)
|
||||
self._blinded = True
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def key_size(self) -> int:
|
||||
return self._key_size
|
||||
|
||||
def decrypt(self, ciphertext: bytes, padding: AsymmetricPadding) -> bytes:
|
||||
self._enable_blinding()
|
||||
key_size_bytes = (self.key_size + 7) // 8
|
||||
if key_size_bytes != len(ciphertext):
|
||||
raise ValueError("Ciphertext length must be equal to key size.")
|
||||
|
||||
return _enc_dec_rsa(self._backend, self, ciphertext, padding)
|
||||
|
||||
def public_key(self) -> RSAPublicKey:
|
||||
ctx = self._backend._lib.RSAPublicKey_dup(self._rsa_cdata)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(ctx != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
ctx = self._backend._ffi.gc(ctx, self._backend._lib.RSA_free)
|
||||
evp_pkey = self._backend._rsa_cdata_to_evp_pkey(ctx)
|
||||
return _RSAPublicKey(self._backend, ctx, evp_pkey)
|
||||
|
||||
def private_numbers(self) -> RSAPrivateNumbers:
|
||||
n = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
e = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
d = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
p = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
q = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
dmp1 = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
dmq1 = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
iqmp = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
self._backend._lib.RSA_get0_key(self._rsa_cdata, n, e, d)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(n[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(e[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(d[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend._lib.RSA_get0_factors(self._rsa_cdata, p, q)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(p[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(q[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend._lib.RSA_get0_crt_params(
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(dmp1[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(dmq1[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(iqmp[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
return RSAPrivateNumbers(
|
||||
p=self._backend._bn_to_int(p[0]),
|
||||
q=self._backend._bn_to_int(q[0]),
|
||||
d=self._backend._bn_to_int(d[0]),
|
||||
dmp1=self._backend._bn_to_int(dmp1[0]),
|
||||
dmq1=self._backend._bn_to_int(dmq1[0]),
|
||||
iqmp=self._backend._bn_to_int(iqmp[0]),
|
||||
public_numbers=RSAPublicNumbers(
|
||||
e=self._backend._bn_to_int(e[0]),
|
||||
n=self._backend._bn_to_int(n[0]),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def private_bytes(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
encoding: serialization.Encoding,
|
||||
format: serialization.PrivateFormat,
|
||||
encryption_algorithm: serialization.KeySerializationEncryption,
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
return self._backend._private_key_bytes(
|
||||
encoding,
|
||||
format,
|
||||
encryption_algorithm,
|
||||
self,
|
||||
self._evp_pkey,
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def sign(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
data: bytes,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: typing.Union[asym_utils.Prehashed, hashes.HashAlgorithm],
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
self._enable_blinding()
|
||||
data, algorithm = _calculate_digest_and_algorithm(data, algorithm)
|
||||
return _rsa_sig_sign(self._backend, padding, algorithm, self, data)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _RSAPublicKey(RSAPublicKey):
|
||||
_evp_pkey: object
|
||||
_rsa_cdata: object
|
||||
_key_size: int
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, backend: Backend, rsa_cdata, evp_pkey):
|
||||
self._backend = backend
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata = rsa_cdata
|
||||
self._evp_pkey = evp_pkey
|
||||
|
||||
n = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
self._backend._lib.RSA_get0_key(
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata,
|
||||
n,
|
||||
self._backend._ffi.NULL,
|
||||
self._backend._ffi.NULL,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(n[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._key_size = self._backend._lib.BN_num_bits(n[0])
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def key_size(self) -> int:
|
||||
return self._key_size
|
||||
|
||||
def __eq__(self, other: object) -> bool:
|
||||
if not isinstance(other, _RSAPublicKey):
|
||||
return NotImplemented
|
||||
|
||||
return (
|
||||
self._backend._lib.EVP_PKEY_cmp(self._evp_pkey, other._evp_pkey)
|
||||
== 1
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def encrypt(self, plaintext: bytes, padding: AsymmetricPadding) -> bytes:
|
||||
return _enc_dec_rsa(self._backend, self, plaintext, padding)
|
||||
|
||||
def public_numbers(self) -> RSAPublicNumbers:
|
||||
n = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
e = self._backend._ffi.new("BIGNUM **")
|
||||
self._backend._lib.RSA_get0_key(
|
||||
self._rsa_cdata, n, e, self._backend._ffi.NULL
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(n[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
self._backend.openssl_assert(e[0] != self._backend._ffi.NULL)
|
||||
return RSAPublicNumbers(
|
||||
e=self._backend._bn_to_int(e[0]),
|
||||
n=self._backend._bn_to_int(n[0]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def public_bytes(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
encoding: serialization.Encoding,
|
||||
format: serialization.PublicFormat,
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
return self._backend._public_key_bytes(
|
||||
encoding, format, self, self._evp_pkey, self._rsa_cdata
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def verify(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
signature: bytes,
|
||||
data: bytes,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: typing.Union[asym_utils.Prehashed, hashes.HashAlgorithm],
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
data, algorithm = _calculate_digest_and_algorithm(data, algorithm)
|
||||
_rsa_sig_verify(
|
||||
self._backend, padding, algorithm, self, signature, data
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def recover_data_from_signature(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
signature: bytes,
|
||||
padding: AsymmetricPadding,
|
||||
algorithm: typing.Optional[hashes.HashAlgorithm],
|
||||
) -> bytes:
|
||||
if isinstance(algorithm, asym_utils.Prehashed):
|
||||
raise TypeError(
|
||||
"Prehashed is only supported in the sign and verify methods. "
|
||||
"It cannot be used with recover_data_from_signature."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _rsa_sig_recover(
|
||||
self._backend, padding, algorithm, self, signature
|
||||
)
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue