mirror of
https://github.com/bombsquad-community/plugin-manager.git
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bc5c5aafc8
pull_request_target checked out fork PR branches with the repo's
write-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN and ran autopep8/metadata scripts/tests
against that fork content, letting a malicious PR rewrite test/*.py
for arbitrary code execution with push access and secrets. It's also
been failing outright for weeks since actions/checkout now blocks
unsafe fork checkouts here without explicit opt-in.
Split into ci-check.yml (plain pull_request, GitHub's read-only
no-secrets token, safe to run fork code) which uploads a diff
artifact, and ci-apply.yml (workflow_run, privileged) which only
applies that diff via `git apply`, never executing fork content.
ci.yml keeps just the push-to-main job as the strict integrity check.
Because GitHub runs the PR's own copy of ci-check.yml for
pull_request events, that artifact is attacker-authored: ci-apply.yml
therefore resolves PR identity from the workflow_run payload plus the
API rather than the artifact, passes every dynamic value through env:
instead of ${{ }} in run: blocks (which the runner substitutes before
the shell parses, so quotes don't contain it), and validates branch,
repo, sha and PR-number shapes before use. The patch itself stays
untrusted input: allowlist-validated and applied only to the fork's
own branch.
test_checks.py adds an env-gated lenient mode so ci-check.yml's
preview run doesn't fail on a brand-new plugin's not-yet-existing
commit sha, while history and push-to-main stay strict.
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||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| auto_apply_plugin_metadata.py | ||
| auto_apply_version_metadata.py | ||
| get_changelog.py | ||
| get_latest.py | ||
| pip_reqs.txt | ||
| test_checks.py | ||
| versioning_tools.py | ||